An analysis of the Dutch-style pension plans proposed by UK policy-makers by Owadally, I. et al.
              
City, University of London Institutional Repository
Citation: Owadally, I. ORCID: 0000-0002-0830-3554, Ram, R. and Regis, L. (2021). An 
analysis of the Dutch-style pension plans proposed by UK policy-makers. Journal of Social 
Policy, 
This is the accepted version of the paper. 
This version of the publication may differ from the final published 
version. 
Permanent repository link:  https://openaccess.city.ac.uk/id/eprint/25588/
Link to published version: 
Copyright and reuse: City Research Online aims to make research 
outputs of City, University of London available to a wider audience. 
Copyright and Moral Rights remain with the author(s) and/or copyright 
holders. URLs from City Research Online may be freely distributed and 
linked to.
City Research Online:            http://openaccess.city.ac.uk/            publications@city.ac.uk
City Research Online
1 
An analysis of the Dutch-style pension plans 
proposed by UK policy-makers 
01/02/21 
Iqbal Owadally, Rahil Ram, Luca Regis 
Abstract 
 Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) pension 
schemes are a variant of collective pension plans that 
are present in many countries and especially common 
in the Netherlands. CDC schemes are based on the 
pooled management of the retirement savings of all 
members, thereby incorporating inter-generational risk-
sharing features. Employers are not subject to 
investment and longevity risks as these are transferred 
to plan members collectively. In this paper, we discuss 
policy related to the proposed introduction of CDC 
schemes to the UK. By means of a simulation-based 
study, we compare the performance of CDC schemes 
vis-à-vis typical Defined Contribution schemes under 
different investment strategies. We find that CDC 
schemes may provide retirees with a higher income 
replacement rate on average, together with less 
uncertainty. 
Keywords: Collective pension schemes, Dutch 
pensions, risk-sharing mechanisms, simulations.  
1 Introduction 
In the search for balance between funding sustainability and the security of 
pensioners’ future income, UK private pension plans have progressively been 
shifting from Defined Benefit (DB) schemes towards Defined Contribution 
(DC) ones. DB pension schemes promise pensioners a pre-determined pension
benefit, based on a formula that accounts for the individual’s earnings, age and
years of service. Companies which sponsor DB schemes take on both the
longevity (or demographic) risk, which is the risk that pensioners live longer
than expected, resulting in more expensive pension liabilities, and the
investment risk from their assets.
In Defined Contribution (DC) pension schemes, employers are relieved 
from demographic risk, and this is transferred to individual scheme members, 
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along with the investment risk. DC scheme members therefore face greater 
uncertainty over their future pension income, compared to DB scheme 
members. DC schemes indeed pay a pension benefit at retirement which is 
based on the contributions paid by individual employees and on the investment 
returns that are earned on these contributions. The largely unexpected increases 
in the life expectancy of pensioners over the last few decades and the declining 
bond yields have caused serious financial sustainability issues for the sponsors 
of DB schemes and have led companies to set up alternative types of schemes 
both in the UK (Clark and Monk, 2006) and worldwide (Conrad, 2012). The 
number of DB plan members in the UK has dropped by as much as 25% in the 
last 10 years (Cowling et al., 2017) while the number of active members in 
occupational DC schemes has soared in the private sector, reaching almost 20 
million in 2020. Nevertheless, there are around 1 million active DB scheme 
members present in the UK (Pensions Regulator, 2020). 
This gradual shift towards a more financialised pension system, which has 
been a defining characteristic of the last 15 years, was the result of a complex 
interaction of policy interventions, union pressures, and changes in the 
regulatory framework, tax rules, and financial landscape (see Bridgen, 2019). 
While relieving plan sponsors from solvency issues, financialisation has had 
profound consequences on the social protection of prospective pensioners 
(Bridgen et al., 2007), and on gender and pension income equality (Lurie, 
2018). 
As a consequence, in the last decade, some UK policy-makers have started to 
question whether the well-known weaknesses of DC schemes can be 
ameliorated. These weaknesses include the complexity of the financial choices 
to which plan members are exposed, the investment risk that individuals have 
to bear, the downside risk of locking in a poor annuity rate at retirement and, 
ultimately, the risk of being left with too small a pension income. These 
features, despite being mostly consequences of the remarkable freedom of 
choice plans offer to members, make planning, both pre- and post-retirement, 
very difficult. Plan members may also face substantial stress and unnecessary 
costs. The Social Market Foundation has calculated that four in ten retirees who 
retire at the age of 65 risk running out of money by the age of 75 if they spend 
at the same rate as Australians (Keohane et al., 2015). It is also clear that wrong 
post-retirement planning choices will have, as a significant drawback, the 
consequence that a growing number of pensioners will have to rely solely on 
the State, because they will exhaust their private pension wealth before they 
die. For these individuals, pension incomes are likely to be inadequate. This 
may affect substantially their quality of life, impairing their “active ageing” 
process (Foster, 2018).  
To try and mitigate the shortcomings of both DB and DC schemes, recent 
proposals have introduced hybrid pension arrangements. Defined Ambition 
(DA) schemes are such an instrument, whose key principle is to substitute 
guarantees with ambitions, i.e. target levels of benefits that can then be adjusted 
according to the financial situation of the pension plan. DA schemes are meant 
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to improve certainty for individuals on the one hand, while reducing risks for 
employers, via risk-sharing mechanisms, on the other. Substantial well-being 
improvements may be achieved if individuals face less uncertainty regarding 
their pensions, as documented by Olivera and Ponomarenko (2017).  
We focus in this paper on Collective Defined Contribution (CDC) pension 
schemes, which are a specific type of DA scheme. There are two crucial 
features of such schemes. First, in CDC schemes, contrary to what happens 
normally in DC schemes, investment assets are not individually handled, but 
are pooled across members. Plan members have no choice in how to invest their 
assets: they give up some freedom in choosing their investment strategies, to 
enjoy intra- and inter-generational risk sharing. There is evidence that different 
socio-economic groups within the same country have different attitudes 
towards solidarity principles (Jaime-Castillo, 2013). This evidence supports the 
idea that offering to prospective pensioners the option of entering a CDC 
pension scheme is useful from a social policy perspective because it enables 
individuals to engage in greater risk-sharing at the level at which they are 
comfortable. Second, the employer does not have to guarantee the level of 
individuals’ pension benefits: pension benefits are defined not as formal 
targets, but as ambitions; they can be cut if the pension plan suffers from 
inadequate funding. 
The introduction of CDC schemes in the UK was discussed during the 2000s 
(see Lewin and Sweeney, 2007), inspired by Dutch occupational pension 
schemes, which have had such risk-sharing arrangements for over 10 years at 
the time. However, the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP, 2009) did 
not actively pursue further the introduction of CDC schemes in the UK at that 
time. While the UK Pension Scheme Act in 2015 effectively enabled the 
development of DA plans and paved the way for possible legislation on CDC 
schemes in  the UK in 2015, it was only in February 2018, when the Royal 
Mail (the UK postal service) and the Communication Workers Union expressed 
interest in establishing a CDC scheme for 140,000 workers that the UK 
Government was effectively pushed to take the initiative. The Parliament, as of 
October 2020, is discussing a bill to provide a framework legislation for CDC 
schemes (see Thurley and Davis, 2020). Many issues are at stake, from how far 
to go on legislating on the design of the specific arrangements, to whether and 
how to allow the transition from DB to the newly introduced CDC schemes. 
 A few studies have sought to assess how CDC schemes would perform if 
introduced in the UK. Wesbroom et al. (2013) conduct an historical analysis 
comparing the performance of CDC and DC schemes. Blake (2016) and Haan 
et al. (2015) compare CDC scheme outcomes with Individual DC schemes 
through a simulation exercise, highlighting the performance smoothing 
capacity of CDC schemes, but also questioning their sustainability in the UK 
context.  
In this work, we aim to provide first a succinct review of the strength and 
the weaknesses of CDC pension schemes with reference to the UK 
environment, benchmarking against international experience. We shed some 
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additional light on the ability of CDC schemes to improve the stability of 
retirement income, while securing the funding of pensions. We complement 
and extend previous analysis by combining an historical and a projection-based 
assessment of the performance of a typical scheme for different cohorts, and by 
comparing this to DC schemes under different investment strategies. This 
highlights the potential benefits of CDC schemes to employers and employees 
in the UK. 
The paper is structured as follows: firstly, we consider the characteristics of 
CDC schemes in the different countries in which they were introduced and we 
analyse the UK proposal; secondly, we discuss their advantages and drawbacks 
vis-à-vis individual pension arrangements; finally, we provide a quantitative 
assessment of the performance of the schemes in terms of expected income 
replacement rates and their volatilities, both retrospectively, using historical 
data, and prospectively, using a simulation approach.  
 
2 CDC schemes: international experience and 
relevance to the UK  
 
In this section, we  discuss the key features of CDC schemes and the 
international experience concerning the operation of these schemes. 
Management of assets. In a CDC plan, assets are pooled (hence the term 
“collective”). Members of a CDC plan have their retirement income paid from 
the scheme and cannot purchase an annuity on retirement nor have the 
flexibility of choosing an income drawdown approach: the CDC scheme 
manages both the accumulation (saving) and the decumulation (spending) 
phase of retirement planning.   
Employer contribution. The contributions that are paid in a CDC scheme 
are defined, that is, pre-determined by a formula which is known by the 
contributing party. Contributions may then be fixed or variable within a pre-
defined range. 
Benefit design. The pension benefits payments that CDC scheme members 
receive are not directly linked to the amount of contributions paid in but are 
instead determined by a set formula, which makes them ultimately dependent 
on the scheme’s financial performance. Benefits are not guaranteed. They are 
usually divided into two components:  
• base benefits are ascertained as a percentage of a particular member’s 
revalued average earnings over her career;  
• ancillary benefits are a conditional additional benefit component, taking 
the form of an inflation-based revaluation of the base benefits, 
contingent upon the financial performance of the scheme.  
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Neither base nor ancillary benefits are guaranteed in principle; they depend 
on the scheme’s financial situation. The funding level is typically used as a 
measure of the financial position of the scheme. This is defined as the 
percentage of the fund liabilities that are backed by assets of the fund.  
If the funding level is within a pre-defined range (above a lower limit and 
below an upper limit), then ancillary benefits can be uprated every year by a 
specified revaluation rate. If the funding level is below the lower limit, 
ancillary benefits can be uprated by less than the revaluation rate, or not uprated 
at all, so that liabilities increase more slowly, and the funding level can be 
restored to within the acceptable range. Adjusting the ancillary benefits may be 
deemed insufficient to restore the funding level to the desired position within a 
chosen recovery period, in which case base benefits can also be reduced. If the 
funding level is above the upper limit, ancillary benefits can be uprated by more 
than the revaluation rate. Thus, the ancillary benefits are adjusted to restore the 
funding level to the upper limit whenever the funding level is above the pre-
determined range.  
Smoothing of outcomes. Bringing together the contributions of a large 
number of members under a single entity allows a CDC plan to protect its 
members from sudden swings in the value of its assets. A CDC plan has the 
opportunity to smooth benefit pay-outs during large market movements. It does 
this by providing higher benefit revaluations when its investments over-
perform, and lower benefit revaluations when investments under-perform. This 
is similar to with-profits life insurance policies. The smoothing horizon varies 
from 10 years in Dutch CDC schemes, to 75 or even 100 years in Canadian 
ones (Bonenkamp et al., 2017). The shorter the horizon, the lower the capability 
of absorbing shocks, but the more stable the funding level is. 
Inter-generational risk-sharing. A CDC plan relies on the risk-sharing 
between different cohorts of members, namely active members, deferred 
members and pensioners, and across different generations. The 
intergenerational risk-sharing nature of a CDC plan is a key lever which allows 
the smoothing of outcomes. The scheme rules should normally stipulate—or at 
least provide guidelines to—how much of the risks can be transferred between 
different cohorts. Welfare gains from risk sharing have been studied by Cui 
et al. (2011) and Chen et al. (2016).   
International experience. These general principles have been implemented 
in practice in different ways. The most notable examples of CDC schemes are 
found in the Netherlands, in Denmark and in Canada. In the Netherlands, most 
occupational second pillar (i.e. work-related) pension schemes have converted 
from DB to CDC in the first years of the new millennium (see Frericks (2013) 
for a description of the Dutch institutional framework and of the impact of 
collective schemes). Indeed, unlike UK-based DB plans, the Dutch ones did 
not have benefit guarantees towards the plan members, thus making the 
transition feasible. These pension plans typically set their calculation formulas 
to reference career-average wages and they index benefits to inflation, 
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conditionally upon the solvency of the pension fund (Bovenberg and Nijman, 
2009). These were also the features of the CDC schemes proposed for the UK 
in 2013 (Wesbroom et al., 2013), and which we will analyse in this paper. In 
Denmark, since 1964, the ATP scheme is a first-pillar (i.e. state-sponsored) 
mandatory arrangement that has all the features of a CDC plan. Contributions 
are partly used to provide guaranteed pension benefits and partly go into a 
separate fund that is used to deliver ancillary benefits through indexation, 
conditional on exceeding a target funding ratio. This is sometimes regarded as 
a Collective Individual Defined Contribution scheme (Bonenkamp et al., 
2014), because only this second slice of the contributions is collectively 
managed. A funded first-pillar CDC scheme was introduced in Canada as well, 
in an attempt to relieve pressure on the traditional state pensions, which are 
paid directly from contributions receipts. It is based on a fixed 9.9% 
contribution rate that gives right to career-average based benefits and ancillary 
benefits related to adjustments for inflation and early retirement. The 
experience of these three countries is useful as a guide for the possible 
introduction of CDC schemes in the UK, although the UK environment is 
different. First of all, CDC pension plans in the UK will provide second-pillar 
pensions and not first-pillar (state-sponsored) ones, as in Denmark and Canada. 
This is the main reason why the closest model that the UK government has used 
as a benchmark for its proposal is the Dutch one. Secondly, participation on the 
employees’ side is likely to remain voluntary, as it is currently. This constitutes 
a crucial feature of the UK pension legislation, and may prevent a wide take-
up of CDC schemes, even if the automatic enrolment rule, which requires 
workers to opt-out explicitly from pension scheme membership, may partially 
offset this drawback. In the next section, we discuss this, together with other 
advantages and disadvantages of CDC schemes, having in mind the UK 
background. 
3 Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages 
of CDC schemes 
 
The features of CDC schemes we have described above lead to several 
advantages and disadvantages, which may depend on several factors that lie 
outside the pure design of the pension scheme. In this section, we discuss this, 
and point out the challenges that UK policy-makers will face when planning 
the rules of implementation of such schemes.  
Fixed contribution rates. Both employers and employees in a CDC pension 
scheme pay contribution rates (as a proportion of salary) that are predictable 
and independent of the scheme’s investment performance, thus allowing better 
financial planning by all parties. 
Scale. Scale is considered a crucial criterion in the success of CDC schemes, 
where they have already been implemented (Blake, 2016). It ensures that a 
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CDC plan benefits from a large number of members – broadly diversified by 
age, salary and other factors – among whom to share the investment and 
longevity risks. Furthermore, larger CDC schemes benefit from greater 
economies of scale (Broeders et al., 2016) in terms of lower overhead costs and 
smaller investment charges. In the Netherlands, participation to second-pillar 
pension provisions is mandatory, guaranteeing scale to Dutch CDC schemes. 
Mandatory participation seems essential to maintain trust in the solidarity and 
intergenerational risk-sharing principles of CDC plans (Cui et al., 2011; 
Gollier, 2008; Chen and Beetsma, 2015). Also, Dutch occupational pension 
schemes pool assets across different employers, even in slightly different 
sectors or within the same industry. Contribution rates to Dutch pension 
schemes are fairly high, which enables their CDC schemes to reach a critical 
mass, in terms of assets under management, to benefit from cost reduction and 
economies of scale. Indeed, when trying to assess the success that CDC 
schemes may have in the UK, scale is likely to be crucial feature, given that 
employees’ participation to second-pillar schemes is voluntary in the UK and 
that, moreover, the typical UK pension contribution rate is lower than in the 
Netherlands.1 
Riskier investments. Since a CDC scheme can effectively transfer risk 
across generations, its investment strategy can be tilted towards riskier assets 
as compared to an individual DC scheme. This, in the long run, should lead to 
higher income replacement rates on average than an individual DC scheme. 
Our analysis in the next section will give support to this statement. Still, 
although constrained by smoothing across time and generations, higher risk-
taking may expose the scheme to underfunding, at least in the short-run. This 
can lead to cuts in pension benefits, because plan members are the ultimate 
bearers of solvency risk. Employers which sponsor CDC pension schemes for 
their employees are not liable for any scheme underperformance (unlike in DB 
pension schemes).  
More stable outcome for members. A CDC plan is able to ensure 
smoother outcomes for its members by sharing risks across generations and 
pooling assets together under a single entity. A CDC plan shares some of the 
principles of with-profits life insurance policies whereby neither bumper nor 
mediocre scheme performance is entirely and immediately reflected in 
members benefits. Conditional indexation of pension benefits to inflation 
reduces the solvency risk of the plan and, consequently, the uncertainty that 
plan members may perceive in this respect. As noted before, since benefits are 
not guaranteed, the plan members remain exposed to downside risks, although 
in general these are less severe than in DC schemes. 
 
Fees. Administrative and operational charges can have a deep impact on net 
investment returns and, ultimately, on the pension income of plan members. 
 
1 Voluntary exits from a CDC pension scheme, their intergenerational effects and 
their impact on the fund sustainability are addressed by Chen et al. (2017). 
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Indeed, a 1% difference in costs, may induce a 27% difference in benefits (see 
Bikker and de Dreu, 2009). Collective agreements (see Bikker et al., 2012) have 
been shown to have an edge over alternative pension fund types in lowering 
administrative costs. Also, based on the Dutch experience, a recent analysis 
(Alserda et al., 2018) finds that industry-wide (CDC) schemes display both 
lower administrative and investment costs, as economies of scale prevail over 
the lack of competitive pressure. Also, the smoothing of outcomes that we 
highlighted in CDC schemes may help reduce investment costs relative to DC 
schemes because of a lower rebalancing frequency. The last government 
proposal (see Thurley and Davis, 2020) advises that CDC schemes should be 
subject to the same rules of DC schemes, specifically with a cap on charges, 
although the international eveidence discussed above suggests that CDC 
schemes may charge their members with lower fees than DC schemes. 
Reduced decision-making complexity for plan members. A CDC 
pension plan manages the plan assets collectively, thus relieving members from 
any choice related to the investment strategy, which may be complex to 
undertake, especially for financially illiterate people. Moreover, the CDC 
scheme manages both the accumulation and the decumulation phases of 
retirement planning, and the individual is not exposed to the risks of 
annuitization timing (i.e. the risk of buying an annuity when annuity rates are 
low), because benefits are directly paid out from the CDC pension fund. 
However, this means that pension savers would need to give up their right to 
choose the investment funds and to decide their own contribution rates. It is 
worth noting that this loss of flexibility, in the UK case, concerns only 
employers’ contributions, because employees’ contributions, given current 
legislation, can be disposed freely, and, for instance, can be destined to DC 
plans of the employees’ choice. Indeed, the case for additional flexibility in 
individual choices within collective schemes has been raised also in the Dutch 
experience (Van Binsbergen et al., 2014), as a means to better match individual 
optimal investment behavior. 
Retirement choice flexibility. In the Netherlands, CDC pension members 
have a fixed retirement age. How to provide retirement choice within CDC 
schemes is still debated, given that flexibility in claiming retirement benefits 
starting from 55 was introduced in 2015 for DC schemes. Allowing such a 
feature in CDC schemes may impair their smoothing ability and jeopardize 
their feasibility. Also, CDC schemes are designed to handle both the 
accumulation and decumulation phase, so it is not intended that members will 
withdraw their accumulated pension wealth at the retirement date. This is an 
inherent constraint which is not consistent with the UK’s pensions freedom 
framework. On the other hand, since CDC pension benefits are less dependent 
on market conditions and annuity rates, it is less likely that plan members will 
need to postpone retirement. This is a positive feature both for individuals, who 
can base their retirement decision primarily on other non-financial factors, and 
for employers, who can better plan human resources and the finances of the 
CDC scheme. 
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Communication of benefits. In DC pension plans, a statement of account 
with an end-of–year balance or capital amount is communicated to plan 
members. In contrast, in a CDC pension plan, the level of benefits is expressed 
as a projected pension income, since this is not directly related to immediate 
investment performance, choices and fees. This type of communication is 
indeed more effective in making individuals able to plan for their future needs 
in retirement. However, it may be difficult to make plan members understand 
the conditional indexation mechanisms implicit in CDC shcemes and the fact 
that benefits are not guaranteed. It may also be argued that investment policies, 
benefit smoothing and inter-generational risk sharing lead to a loss of 
transparency (Aitken, 2014). In particular, the structure of intergenerational 
guarantees may be complex or difficult to understand (Van Binsbergen et al., 
2014). 
Inter-generational risk-sharing and risk-pooling may be unfair. The 
nature of the cross-generational risk-sharing mechanisms may lead to different 
final outcomes across young and old plan members. CDC schemes’ smoothed 
outcomes can indeed be higher or lower than actual market performance, 
depending on the retirement date. However, many studies highlight the welfare 
optimality of risk-sharing based plans relative to optimal individual investment 
(see for example Cui et al., 2011). Voluntary participationmay indeed lead to 
different participation rates across cohort, possibly jeopardizing inter-
generational risk sharing optimality. Also, low-earners are expected to cross-
subsidise high-earners; low-earners contribute for longer, as they leave school 
and join the workforce earlier, but receive benefits for a shorter span of time, 
as they have a lower life expectancy. This is a side-effect of risk pooling, 
present in all insurance systems, whereby one group of members bears a greater 
proportion of the risk.  
4 Modelling and comparing the performances of 
CDC and DC schemes 
This section investigates, both with an historically-based and with a simulation-
based approach, the performance of a typical CDC scheme compared with its 
natural contender, the DC scheme, which is currently the most common type 
of pension provision in the UK.  
4.1  Methodology 
We consider the case of a female2 pension scheme member who joins the 
scheme at age 40 and retires at age 65, to model a member with a 25-year long 
contribution history. She pays a contribution into the scheme of 10% of pay 
 
2 This is only relevant because in our study the price of the annuity bought at 
retirement is actuarially fair (abstracting thus from the gender equalisation issue) 
and females have lower mortality at almost all ages than males. 
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every year. Pay increases every year at a constant rate of 3.5%, which matches 
the historical average wage increase of a private sector worker in the last 50 
years. No expenses and fees are incurred. For simplicity, we assume that 
membership is stable. Unstable membership could have consequences not only 
to the stability of a CDC scheme’s finances, as mentioned earlier, but also to 
the adequacy of the retirement savings of the members, and this is especially 
relevant for low-income earners. 
We seek to contrast the income replacement rates delivered by (1) a CDC 
scheme, which invests all of its assets in the UK stock market (UK equities), 
(2) a DC scheme which invests in UK equities only, (3) a DC scheme which 
invests in UK government bonds (gilts) only, and (4) a DC scheme which 
follows an age-phased or lifestyle investment strategy, gradually shifting the 
allocation from equity to bonds, and investing everything in bonds as from the 
time point of ten years prior to retirement.  
The benefit design of the CDC scheme is the following. The base benefits 
are defined in terms of 1% of Career Average Revalued Earnings (CARE). 
Hence, post-retirement income from base benefits (BB) for an individual 
joining the plan at age x is given by the following formula:  
 𝐵𝐵 = 1%∑ 𝑆𝑎𝑙(𝑥 + 𝑘)!"#$   
where N is the number of years of service, and Sal(x+k) is the salary earned at 
age x+k, with x the initial age of the worker. The index k ranges from 1 to N to 
account for the base benefits pertaining all the years of service. Pension benefits 
are therefore linked to salary, which is a valuable feature for plan members 
(Fernandez, 2012).  
The ancillary benefits consist of the revaluation of the base benefits. The 
revaluation rate is fixed at 2%, if the funding level (ratio of assets and liabilities 
of the fund) lies within the range 90–110%3. This range is called the funding 
gate. An automatic mechanism, which adjusts the level of ancillary benefits (or 
base benefits, if needed) resets the level of funding to 110% if the funding level 
is outside the funding gate. There is no smoothing, as re-adjustments are made 
by cutting end-of-year ancillary benefits (or base benefits, if needed). 
The DC scheme member at retirement, instead, buys an inflation-linked annuity 
with his/her accumulated pension wealth. Thus, the pension benefits are the 
inflation-linked annual lifetime income the member obtains by this annuity.  
 
3 To compute the funding ratio, assets and liabilities are modelled. Every year, the 
assets increase with investment returns and with contribution income but decrease with 
pension benefit outgo paid to pensioners. To value the liabilities, we assume a 
stationary pension scheme population with twice the number of active members (who 
are working and pay a contribution) than retirees (who receive a pension). The pension 
liability is then calculated using the SCG standard cashflow generator described by 
Collie (2012), increased in line with inflation. 
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In the historical analysis section, we compare the performance of the four 
schemes, using the yearly financial returns historically realized by the UK 
equity market and government bonds from 1930 to 2015 to compute the 
accumulated pension pots of pension scheme members entering the scheme in 
the different years. Data are taken from Barclays Bank (2016). 
When computing the future expected performance of the DC and CDC 
pension plans over the period 2016 to 2065, we instead use a simulation 
approach. We set up a model that generates randomly future equity returns, 
bond returns and inflation. The model reproduces the observed characteristics 
of the variables in the period 1930-2015. We assume no salary or demographic 
risks. We simulate 1000 economic scenarios, i.e. 1000 possible realizations of 
the series of future returns, bonds and inflation, and compute, for each, the 
income replacement rates for our sample member for the four different types 
of pension funds. The Appendix supplies further technical details. 
 
4.2  Historical analysis 
In this section, we analyse the income replacement rates at retirement that our 
pension member would have obtained by staying in a pension scheme until 
retirement (at the fixed age of 65). The rates are illustrated in Figure 1 for the 
CDC and the three DC schemes, with the corresponding statistics shown in 
Table 1.  
[Insert Here Figure 1] 
[Insert Here Table 1]  
Figure 1 shows the income replacement rate obtained by a member who 
retires in different years (but always at the fixed retirement age of 65). The 
graph for the CDC scheme is always higher than that for the DC scheme 
following the all-bond strategy, and higher than the lifestyle investing DC, 
except for a few years during the late Nineties. Table 1 shows that the mean 
and median income replacement rates are higher in the CDC scheme than in 
all 3 DC schemes. The median outcome under the CDC plan is higher than the 
bond-based strategy by 2.5 times and the lifestyle strategy by 1.5 times. On 
average, the CDC scheme also outperforms the all-equity DC scheme (32.33% 
versus 31.78%), showing however a much less volatile outcome (9.15% versus 
17.47%). Indeed, the coefficient of variation of the replacement rates, which is 
the ratio of the standard deviation and the mean and thus provides a measure of 
risk per unit of expected return, is lowest for the CDC scheme. Due to its 
inherent internal smoothing mechanics, the CDC benefit structure provides 
more stable outcomes. 
It is worth noticing, from Figure 1, that this smoothing prevents the CDC 
plan from performing as well as both the all-equity and lifestyle strategies in 
years with a booming equity market, for example in the 1990s. The converse is 
true in years when market conditions are bad or average, for example in the 
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early 2000s, after the dot-com crash. This is due to the fact that benefits in a 
CDC scheme are only adjusted when the funding level breaches the funding 
gate. 
It is interesting to note how variable the income replacement rates can be 
for a member in the DC scheme, hence making retirement planning difficult. 
For example, Figure 1 shows that a member of the DC scheme following the 
life-style strategy who retires in 1999 would have enjoyed an income 
replacement rate of 56.3%, while a member retiring only five years later would 
have received a mere 27.2%, a fall of more than 50%, due to the much more 
adverse market conditions. Members of the CDC scheme retiring in the same 
years would have also experienced a fall in their income replacement rates, but 
not so severe (from 42.0% to 32.5%). The DC scheme member is indeed much 
more exposed to the whims of the markets compared to a CDC scheme 
member. 
Table 2 displays the performance of the CDC scheme vis-à-vis the DC 
lifestyle scheme during the financial crisis of the late 2000s. Table 2 clearly 
shows that the mean outcome for the CDC scheme is higher throughout this 
period, while the volatility is always lower. It is interesting to point out that the 
CDC scheme does not suffer from considerable sudden jumps or falls in income 
replacement rates which can jeopardise the retirement planning of an individual 
member. Also, it is worth recalling that this result is reached following a very 
risky investment strategy, with all pension savings invested in the stock market. 
Indeed, the reported Liability Sharpe Ratio, which is a risk-adjusted measure 
of the performance of the scheme (namely the mean income replacement rate 
as a proportion of its standard deviation) is always higher for the CDC scheme. 
Nonetheless, this leads to a lower volatility level than the DC lifestyle scheme 
and to the lowest coefficient of variation (a mean-standardised measure of 
dispersion, defined as the ratio of the standard deviation and the mean) among 
all alternatives. 
[Insert Here Table 2]   
Figure 2 reports the expected replacement rates at retirement for an individual 
at each year-end from their enrollment in the pension scheme, until retirement 
at age 65 in 2009. This can be thought of as the expected pension income which 
is communicated to each pensioner. It is evident that the pensioner enrolled in 
the DC plan would have been told at some point during her working years that 
her income replacement rate would be drastically different to the one predicted 
just a few years before: at the age of 42 she could expect an income replacement 
rate of around 28%, but two years later her projected replacement rate was 
nearly half that amount. This graph exemplifies the unpredictability inherent in 
the outcomes from DC plans, which not only makes retirement planning 
difficult but also makes it harder for employees to chart their financial journey 
pre-retirement. 
[Insert Here Figure 2] 
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The CDC scheme offers instead a smoother ride over the years, hence 
making retirement planning and all the associated decisions easier and more 
reliable. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the fact that during those four years, 
the CDC plan does show a difference between the starting and ending income 
replacement rate, although not drastic. We can attribute this to the fact that the 
plan in our model is exposed fully to the stock market, which was very volatile 
during the financial crisis. 
To understand better the mechanism by which benefits are adjusted in the 
CDC scheme, we analyse the pattern of benefit adjustments over a long 
historical window, which starts in 1931 and ends in 2015. Out of a total of 85 
years, benefits are fully increased 59 times, and cut or unchanged only at the 
beginning of the plan’s life. The benefit cuts occur mostly during the Great 
Depression and the ensuing years in the 1930s. As the scheme matures, there 
are virtually no cuts due to the risk-sharing feature of CDC plans and the build-
up of the scheme’s assets.4 
The benefit adjustments for the CDC plan can be very sizeable and also 
volatile over the years. However, this is partly due to some of the simplifying 
assumptions we have made in our model. In particular, any shortfall or excess 
of the funding level in relation to our funding gate is corrected immediately by 
adjusting the benefits, while in practice they can be amortised over a period of 
time and hence follow a smoother pattern. Secondly, the nominal liability cash 
flows are assumed to grow with price inflation every year. This simplification 
implies that the pension plan assets grow faster than pension liabilities because 
contributions are assumed to grow with salary inflation, which is higher than 
price inflation. In practice, the liability cash flows will be closely linked to the 
contribution cash flows, implying a closer match and slower adjustment to 
benefits. Another reason why our model displays large and volatile benefit 
revaluations is that the present value of the liabilities in each year ignores the 
adjustments made in the previous year (due to funding level breaches) and is 
instead set to be the expected present value determined from the original 
unadjusted liability cash flows. This tends to understate (overstate) the 
scheme’s funding level at each point if the funding level was below (above) the 
lower (upper) limit, hence resulting in drastic decreases (increases) in benefit 
adjustments. Correcting for this simplification will result in a smoother benefit 
adjustment over time. Such simplifications do not undermine the fact that the 
CDC plan results in more positive than negative benefit adjustments. 
 
4  This is consistent with the conclusions of Wesbroom et al. (2013) that base 
benefits would have been cut only during the Great Depression, World War II and 
in 1953. In the period from 1930 to 1956, inflation-linked benefit revaluations 
occur. Benefit adjustments in the subsequent years are made on top of the 
revaluation rate. 
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4.3  Projected income replacement rates 
In this section, we make use of simulations to evaluate the future projected 
income replacement rates for our plan member from 2016 to 2065. Modelling 
future behaviour, rather than back-testing on historical data, allows us to 
determine whether the CDC plan maintains its edge over the DC plan. 
In Table 3 we contrast the distribution of the income replacement rates for 
individuals retiring with 25 years of service between 2041 and 2050. Our 
simulation leads to the generation of 10,000 income replacement rates per plan. 
 
[Insert Here Table 3]  
The median outcome (50th percentile) for the CDC pension plan is higher 
than that of all the other DC schemes. In addition, the 5th–95th percentile range 
for the CDC plan is narrower than all but the DC All-bond plan, implying 
remarkable stability of outcomes. Also, the CDC scheme has by far the highest 
income replacement rate in the 5% worst-case scenario, depicted by the 5th 
percentile, which shows the highest value (21%). This indicates that the CDC 
scheme is the least exposed to downside risk: in the event of a very 
unfavourable economic scenario, it displays the highest performance, 
compared to all the DC schemes. The All-equity DC scheme has higher 
percentiles above the median, but it suffers from higher downside risks, more 
uncertain outcomes and a lower median.  
These results hold when we extend the simulation horizon, from 2051 to 
2065. We find that the CDC plan displays a higher average income replacement 
rate than the DC lifestyle plan in every single year. In addition, its 25th 
percentile outcome is always higher than the median of the DC lifestyle scheme 
across every single simulation year. The CDC plan not only provides a higher 
replacement rate on average, but it is also expected to provide a higher 
replacement rate for every projected year.  
We identify only 39 instances of benefit cuts, out of a sample size of 25,000 
simulated. Benefit cuts occur when the funding level of the scheme falls below 
the lower limit of the funding gate, set to 90%. Hence, a benefit cut is expected 
to occur with a probability of only 0.16%, which is small compared to the 
historical probability (2%) we have obtained in the previous subsection. This 
result seems to suggest that benefit cuts are expected to be very rare and to 
happen only under extreme economic conditions. 
We acknowledge that we have made some simplifications. The individual is 
assumed to work with no career breaks, and enter the scheme relatively late in 
her lifetime (a situation which can reproduce a switch to a CDC from another 
scheme). Sensitivitiy analysis – which we leave to future work – may shed 
some light on how smoothing and risk-sharing work for different types of plan 
members. 
Also, we have made some simplifying assumptions in the way that our schemes 
operate for ease of modelling. We assumed a stable membership for the CDC 
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scheme, i.e. that the distribution by age of the plan population does not change 
over time. One might expect the CDC plan to operate optimally under such 
conditions. In practice, the distribution of members by age may vary over time, 
for example in an industry where new technology may supplant new younger 
employees, resulting in a slowly maturing plan population. Nonetheless, CDC 
pension plans should have a fairly stable membership profile if they encompass 
a large number of employees, possibly diversified across many employers and 
industries. On the other hand, we also assumed, for the sake of simplicity, that 
the liability present values are adjusted within one year, whereas in practice the 
adjustment will happen over an amortisation period (10 years for the Dutch 
CDC schemes, for instance). Spreading the adjustments over a longer period of 
time, rather than just one year, will lead to smoother benefit adjustments. Also, 
we assumed full annuitization in our modelled CDC plan. The income 
replacement rates could be lower if members are given the ability to take a lump 
sum at retirement in exchange for a lower pension.The comparison that we 
draw is fair since we assumed full annuitization for the DC schemes as well. 
However, individuals’ reluctance to annuitize and preference towards lump 
sums at retirement (see Inkmann et al., 2010) may disincentivise membership 
of CDC schemes, which inherently constrain pension freedom by managing 
both the accumulation and decumulation of a member’s pension wealth.  
5  Discussion and concluding comments 
This paper discusses the characteristics and possible advantages of Collective 
Defined Contribution (CDC) plans, which have been proposed for pension 
provision in the UK. We described the most important features of CDC plans 
and we assessed, through a quantitative analysis exercise, their performance 
compared to DC pension schemes with different investment strategies. 
Our illustrative analysis provides evidence that a CDC plan can be beneficial 
for both employers and employees. A CDC plan is able to provide higher and 
more stable pensions for its members by sharing risks across generations and 
by smoothing outcomes during unexpected market swings. The results hold 
true both looking at historical data and at forward projections using a scenario-
generating model. 
We also highlighted the main advantages of CDC schemes. CDC scheme 
members are relieved from difficult financial decisions, whilst employers are 
not burdened with any balance sheet risk because contribution rates are fixed 
and pensions are not guaranteed. With a large enough size, a CDC pension plan 
may take advantage of economies of scale, hence reducing investment costs 
and other overheads.  
All in all, the CDC pension plan seems to fit in with the UK government 
policy aim of providing a half-way solution between the two polarised models 
currently existing, namely the DB and the DC pension schemes. Although it is 
not perfect, the CDC plan appears to better fulfil the policy aim of making 
pensions less of a lottery for pension savers, as compared to a DC scheme.  
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While appetite for such schemes has been moderate until 2018, the interest 
expressed by Royal Mail in starting a large scheme covering 140,000 potential 
members served as a trigger for legislative action and CDC schemes are likely 
to become a viable option in 2021 or 2022. The question arises as to whether 
other DB schemes or DC ones will be interested in a transition to the CDC 
world. While it is likely that some remaining active private sector DB schemes 
may convert to the CDC model, it seems unlikely at the present time that DC 
schemes will transition. This may change in the future if pension poverty 
emerges from DC pension provision, especially for lower-income workers. It 
may also be the case that some public sector schemes may adopt CDC-like 
characteristics. An effective statutory and regulatory framework will be crucial 
in making CDC pension plans feasible and attractive both to companies which 
sponsor pension plans and to employees who save for their pensions. The UK’s 
legislative environment is now faced with the practical challenges of 
introducing CDC plans. Several issues are at stake, such as the amendment of 
the tax system, and the voluntarism of pension scheme membership, and these 
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Appendix: Data and details on the simulations 
While historical data are obtained from Barclays Bank (2016), interest rates 
and mortality rates required to calculate the price of the annuities bought by 
DC pension scheme members when they retire are obtained from the Bank of 
England data and the Institute and Faculty of Actuaries dataset, 2018, 
respectively. 
In the historical analysis, we use the historical data directly. In the projection 
analysis, we perform stochastic (or Monte Carlo) simulations using a bootstrap 
method. First, we fit a VAR (vector autoregressive) model of order 1 to the 
time series data Xt=c+βXt-1+εt , where Xt is a column vector of length 3 
containing equity returns, bond returns and inflation in year t; c is a column 
vector of constants; β is a 3×3 matrix of coefficients; and εt is a column vector 
of zero-mean Normally distributed residuals. We can then simulate from this 
model as follows. Starting from a random year, we collect the returns and 
inflation data for that year in the vector Xt−1. We simulate a random vector εt 
which is distributed according to the same Normal distribution as was estimated 
for the residuals. We then calculate the returns and inflation for the next year 
according to the VAR model, i.e. Xt=c+βXt−1+εt. This process is continued 
recursively to simulate returns and inflation over successive periods. When 
comparisons are required, we take care to use the same pseudo-random 
sequence of returns and inflation to avoid statistical sampling error. 
